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Abstract
Neural dialogue models have been widely adopted in various chatbot applications
because of their good performance in simulating and generalizing human conversa-
tions. However, there exists a dark side of these models – due to the vulnerability of
neural networks, a neural dialogue model can be manipulated by users to say what
they want, which brings in concerns about the security of practical chatbot services.
In this work, we investigate whether we can craft inputs that lead a well-trained
black-box neural dialogue model to generate targeted outputs. We formulate this as
a reinforcement learning (RL) problem and train a Reverse Dialogue Generator
which efficiently finds such inputs for targeted outputs. Experiments conducted
on a representative neural dialogue model show that our proposed model is able to
discover such desired inputs in a considerable portion of cases. Overall, our work
reveals this weakness of neural dialogue models and may prompt further researches
of developing corresponding solutions to avoid it.
1 Introduction
Dialogue system, also known as conversational AI, which aims to conduct human-like conversations
with users, is receiving increasing attention from both the industry and the academic research
community. In the past, such systems either rely on intricate hand-crafted rules [1, 2], or depend
on a complicated processing pipeline including a series of functional modules [3]. Meanwhile,
retrieval-based methods [4, 5, 6, 7], which search a suitable response from a repository given the
query, are also adopted in many application scenarios. These methods are able to provide natural,
human-like responses, but fail to generate novel responses out of the range of the repository [8].
Recently, researchers begin to involve deep learning techniques in building fully data-driven and
end-to-end dialogue systems [9], which are referred to as neural dialogue models.
Based on the Seq2Seq framework [10], these neural models [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] have achieved
surprising performances and gradually dominate the field of dialogue generation. First, these models
are easy to train. Instead of designing complicated rules or modularized pipelines, the models can
learn the mapping between queries and responses automatically from massive existing dialogue
pairs [12]. Second, given that the neural models are trained on large-scale human conversation data,
they show a strong generalization ability that they can handle open-domain conversations rather
than restricting the topics in a narrow domain [12, 16]. In addition, neural dialogue models can
provide fluent and smooth responses, and show the intelligence of performing simple common sense
reasoning [12]. Since neural dialogue models achieve a breakthrough of conducting reasonable and
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engaging human-like conversations, they are widely adopted by the industry as a core component of
practical chatbot applications, such as Microsoft XiaoIce [16].
While the research community is delighted with the success of neural dialogue models, there is a
dark side of these models. Given that the internal mechanisms of neural networks are not explicitly
interpretable, neural dialogue models are vulnerable. For example, they may have unpredictable
behaviors with regard to some well-crafted inputs [17, 18]. This vulnerability can cause a series of
problems, one of which is, whether we can manipulate a dialogue agent to say what we want. In other
words, can we find a well-designed input, to induce the agent to provide a desired output? If this is
possible, people with ulterior motives may take advantage of this weakness of the chatbots to guide
them say something malicious or sensitive, causing adverse social impacts [19, 20, 21].
In this paper, we want to study this dark side by seeking an answer to the question – whether we can
design an algorithm that can automatically generate inputs that lead a state-of-the-art black-box neural
dialogue model to “say what I want”. However, this presents tremendous challenges. First, unlike
similar works such as [22], where the authors try to craft inputs for a neural image captioning model
to output targeted sentences, our problem involves discrete inputs (i.e. texts rather than images) and
treats the model as a black-box (since the setting is more realistic). Thus, the traditional optimization
method that finds the inputs by the guidance of gradient information is completely invalid. Second,
when trying to manipulate a dialogue system released by others, it is impractical for us to interact
with it for unlimited times. Based on this point, brute-force search methods cannot be adopted, and
the number of the interactions with the black-box model that we need to find an input for a targeted
output should be restricted to a reasonable level.
To address the above challenges, for a given black-box neural dialogue model, we propose to
train a corresponding Reverse Dialogue Generator, which takes a targeted response as input and
automatically outputs a query that leads the dialogue model to return that response. The proposed
Reverse Dialogue Generator is based on a Seq2Seq model and performs as a reinforcement learning
(RL) agent. The black-box dialogue model is regarded as the environment the agent interacts with. It
is optimized through policy gradients, with the similarity between the targeted outputs and what the
dialogue model outputs with regard to a crafted input as the reward signal. Extensive experiments
conducted on a public well-trained neural dialogue model demonstrate the capacity of our model.
2 Related Works
Basically, our work is related to the problem of model attacks. Although deep learning models have
been used for many tasks that have shown to be useful across a plethora of domains, more recently,
researchers have become aware to the fact that although these systems perform extremely well when
in a perfect and stable environment (the type they were designed in), but when placed in the real
world, they are quite easily susceptible to being attacked. Szegedy et al. [17] first investigates the
vulnerability of DNN-based image classifiers by crafting adversarial examples with imperceptible
perturbations that lead the classifier to make mistakes. Besides, Sharif et al. [23] focus on attacking
face recognition models; Xie et al. [24] try to find the weakness of an object detection system;
in [25, 26], researchers study the robustness of generative models, and novel methods to make
adversarial examples for deep reinforcement learning based models are introduced in [27, 28].
Adversarial attacks on deep learning models for NLP tasks also attract a lot of interest. Attacking
NLP models are more challenging since the inputs are discrete texts instead of continuous values
such as image inputs [29]. Text classification problems are studied in [30, 31]; sentiment analysis
is involved in [32]; grammar error detection is investigated in [33]. And Belinkov et al. [34] try
to fool a machine translation system, while Chan et al. [35] study how to attack a neural reading
comprehension model. Besides, more works can be found in the survey [29].
For dialogue generation task, Wieting et al. [36] explore the over-sensitivity and over-stability of
neural dialogue models by using some heuristic techniques to modify original inputs and observe the
corresponding outputs. They evaluate the robustness of dialogue models by checking whether the
outputs change significantly after the modifications on the inputs but don’t consider targeted outputs.
The work which is most related to ours is [21], where the authors try to find trigger inputs which
can lead a neural dialogue model to output a list of targeted egregious responses. Different from our
work, they treat the dialogue model as a white-box and take advantage of the model structure and
parameters. By comparison, our black-box setting is more challenging. Furthermore, their algorithm
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Figure 1: The agent-environment setup of the proposed framework.
indeed fails to lead the dialogue model to output the exact targeted responses. It should be pointed
out that similar with [21], our work is not a model attack task in the true sense since we only focus on
the requirements of the outputs but don’t force the inputs to be close to any original inputs. However,
our problems should be solved following the same ideas as adversarial attack problems.
By the way, nevertheless Cheng et al. [37] don’t focus on dialogue generation, they also try to
manipulate a seq2seq model to generate texts with certain restrictions. However, their non-overlapping
and targeted keywords settings are looser than ours where a whole targeted response is required to be
output, and this work is under the white-box assumption.
3 Reverse Dialogue Generator
In this work, we consider the specific neural dialogue model D of our interest as a black-box
environment. The dialogue model D is able to take an input sentence I and output a corresponding
response sentence O. Now given a targeted output O∗, our goal is to find a well-designed input I ,
which leads the dialogue model D to output a response O that is exactly the same as O∗ (O = O∗),
or at least similar with O∗ in semantics (O ≈ O∗). To achieve it, we build a Reverse Dialogue
Generator agent Gθ, which takes the targeted output O∗ as input to predict its corresponding input I .
A sketch of this agent-environment setup is shown in Figure 1.
3.1 The Dialogue Model Environment
In this work, we adopt the classical Seq2Seq neural dialogue model [12] as the dialogue model
environment. In the model, the encoder and the decoder are implemented by two independent RNN
structures or its variants such as LSTM [38] and GRU [39]. The encoder reads the input sentence
word by word and encodes it as a low-dimensional latent representation, which is then fed into the
decoder to predict the corresponding response sentence word by word. We assume the environment
is a black-box; once the model is well-trained, we keep it sealed and the agent has no access to its
structures, parameters or gradients.
Thanks to its strong power in the simulation and generalization of human conversations, Seq2Seq-
based neural dialogue generator has been applied as an important component of practical chatbot
services [16]. Thus, it is representative to be regarded as the object of study. However, due to
the black-box setting of the dialogue model environment, we can manipulate other neural dialogue
models such as HRED [14], VHRED [15], etc., indiscriminately through our proposed method. We
leave the investigation into other choices as one future work.
3.2 The Reverse Dialogue Generator Model
In order to find a corresponding input for a given targeted output, it is intuitive to formulate this
problem as an optimization problem where we need to find an optimal input I so that the similarity
between the output O = D(I) and the targeted output O∗ are maximized. However, the standard
gradient-based back-propagation approach is not applicable to this scenario. Because the input I
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consists of discrete tokens instead of continuous values, we cannot directly use gradient information
to adjust it. If we make adjustments with regard to the word embeddings, this method will generate
results that cannot be matched with any valid words in the word embedding space [29]. What’s more,
in our black-box setting, we are not allowed to get the gradient information from D.
Therefore, in our work, we formulate this problem as a reinforcement learning problem. A generative
agentGθ, which is called Reverse Dialogue Generator, is trained to craft an input I for a given targeted
output O∗, with the aim to maximize the reward, that is, the similarity between the current output O
and the targeted output O∗. The agent Gθ treats the input generation process as a decision-making
process, and it is trained through policy gradient with the guidance of the reward signals.
An RNN language model can be adopted as the agent Gθ. However, we have to retrain it for each
targeted output to obtain the desired input, which requires a great number of interactions with the D
for every single targeted output. It is unachievable in reality when hackers try to manipulate a chatbot
service. Instead, we adopt a classical Seq2Seq structure as the agent Gθ, which takes a targeted
output as input and crafts the desired input. It is trained offline, and when deployed in practical
applications, it is able to generate the corresponding inputs for lots of targeted outputs automatically.
The details of its training process are described in Section 4.2.
4 Training
In this section, we detail the training process of the dialogue model environment D and the Reverse
Dialogue Generator model Gθ.
4.1 The Dialogue Model Environment
The Seq2Seq dialogue model is trained on a large-scale human conversation data collected on Twitter
in a supervised manner with the aim to minimize the negative log-likelihood of the ground truth
sentence given inputs. Afterward, it is treated as the black-box environment and its parameters are
not further updated. The details of the implementation can be found in Section 5.1.1.
4.2 RL Training of Reverse Dialogue Generator Model
In this subsection, we detail the RL training process of the proposed Reverse Dialogue Generator
agent Gθ. In summary, the agent (Reverse Dialogue Generator Gθ) interacts with the environment
(the dialogue model D). Given a state (the targeted output O∗), the agent takes an action (generating
an input I) following a policy piθ (defined by the Seq2Seq model in the Reverse Dialogue Generator),
and then receives a reward (the similarity between the targeted output O∗ and current output O) from
the environment. Afterward, the policy piθ is updated to maximize the reward.
Next, we will introduce the environment, state, policy, action, and reward in detail.
4.2.1 Environment
The environment is the black-box dialogue model D. When fed into an input I , it returns an output
O = D(I). The input and the output are two dialogue utterances, which consist of a sequence of
words with variable length.
4.2.2 State
A state is denoted as the targeted output O∗, that is, the input of the Reverse Dialogue Generator.
4.2.3 Policy and Action
The policy piθ is defined by the Seq2Seq model in the agent Gθ and its parameters. The Seq2Seq
model forms a stochastic policy which assigns a probability to any possible input I = (ω1, . . . , ωT ):
piθ(I|O∗) =
T∏
t=1
P (ωt|ω1, . . . , ωt−1, O∗) (1)
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where T is the length of the input and ωt is the t-th word.
The action is defined as the input I to generate. When observing the state O∗, the agent generates an
input based on the distribution predicted by piθ in Equation (1). In the training phase, the input is
chosen by stochastic sampling. And in the test phase, the input can be chosen in a greedy manner or
through beam search.
4.2.4 Reward
Recall that our goal is to train the agent Gθ to craft an input for the dialogue model D to return an
output that is as similar with the targeted output O∗ as possible. Let O be the actual output returned
by the dialogue model D given a crafted input I . We directly use the similarity between the targeted
output O∗ and the current output O as the reward for the input I selected by piθ.
We adopt the embedding average metric to measure the similarity. This metric has been frequently
used in many NLP domains, such as textual similarity tasks [36], since it’s able to measure the
similarity of two sentences in semantic level rather than simply consider the amount of word-overlap.
The embedding average approach first computes the sentence-level embedding e¯r of a sentence r by
taking the average of the embeddings eω of all the constituent words ω in it: e¯r =
∑
ω∈r eω
‖∑ω′∈r eω′‖2 , and
then the similarity between two sentences is defined as the cosine similarity of their corresponding
sentence-level embeddings. Given a crafted input I and the targeted output O∗, we formally define
the reward as the similarity between the current output O and the targeted output O∗:
R(I|O∗) = Sim(O∗, D(I)) = cos(e¯O, e¯O∗) (2)
4.2.5 Optimization
With the reward function defined above, the objective function that the agent aims to maximize can
be formulated as follows:
J(θ) = EI∼piθ(I|O∗)R(I|O∗) (3)
The accurate value of J(θ) in Equation (3) is very difficult to obtain in practice. Therefore, previous
works have proposed many methods to estimate it and its gradient, which is then used to update the
parameters θ of the policy (i.e., piθ).
To optimize the objective in Equation (3), we apply the widely used REINFORCE algorithm [40],
where Monte-Carlo sampling is applied to estimate∇θJ(θ). Specifically,
∇θJ(θ) =
∑
I
R(I|O∗)∇piθ(I|O∗) (4)
=
∑
I
R(I|O∗)piθ(I|O∗)∇ log piθ(I|O∗)
= EI∼piθ(I|O∗)[R(I|O∗)piθ(I|O∗)∇ log piθ(I|O∗)]
≈ 1
N
N∑
R(I|O∗)piθ(I|O∗)∇ log piθ(I|O∗)
With the obtained gradient ∇θJ(θ), the parameters of the policy network piθ can be updated as
follows:
θ := θ + α∇θJ(θ) (5)
where α is the learning rate. Thus, the REINFORCE algorithm for updating the policy piθ can be
summarized as: For each targeted output O∗, we first sample N inputs according to the distribution
piθ(·|O∗). Then we estimate the rewards of the sampled inputs and calculate the gradient. Finally, we
update the parameters of the policy network.
5 Experiments
We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed Reverse Dialogue
Generator. We measure the success rates of the proposed model in seeking out the desired inputs
towards various targeted outputs and explore the performance of the model under various settings. In
this section, we will go into details about the experimental settings and results.
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5.1 Experimental Settings
5.1.1 The Dialogue Model
To ensure the reproducibility of the experiments, we directly adopt the well-trained Seq2Seq dialogue
model released on the dialogue system research software platform ParlAI [41] as the dialogue model
environment. The implementation of the dialogue model is detailed as follows. In the Seq2Seq model,
both the encoder and the decoder are implemented by 3-layer LSTM networks with hidden states
of size 1024. As the standard practice, the initial hidden state of the decoder is set as the same as
the last hidden state of the encoder. The vocabulary size is 30,000. Pre-trained Glove word vectors
[42] are used to initialize the word embeddings whose dimension is set as 300. The model had been
trained through stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with a learning rate of 1.0 on 2.5 million Twitter
single-turn dialogues. In the training process, the dropout rate and gradient clipping value are both
set to be 0.1. It should be pointed out again that in the following experiments, this dialogue model is
treated as a black-box which takes an input sentence and output a response sentence.
5.1.2 The Reverse Dialogue Generator
As described above, we adopt a Seq2Seq structure as the Reverse Dialogue Generator. Two 2-layer
LSTM networks with the hidden size of 1,024 are applied as the encoder and the decoder respectively.
The vocabulary size is set to be 60,000, and all the size of word embeddings is 300. The word
embeddings are randomly initialized and fine-tuned during the training process. The last hidden
state of the encoder is treated as the context vector which is used to initialize the hidden state of the
decoder.
Pre-training. Before RL training, we first initialize the agent by pre-training it on output-input pairs
in a reference corpus in a supervised learning manner. We build the reference corpus in this way: we
first randomly collect 160K posts from Twitter, and then we feed them into the dialogue model to get
the corresponding responses output by the model. Finally we obtain 160K output-input pairs as the
reference corpus. Specifically, in the pre-training process, the model is optimized by the standard
SGD algorithm with the initial learning rate of 20. At the end of each epoch, if the loss doesn’t
decrease in the validation set, the learning rate is reduced with a decay rate of 0.25. And the batch
size is 16. In addition, to prevent overfitting issues, we apply the dropout with the rate of 0.1 and
gradient clipping with clip-value being 0.25.
RL training. In the RL training process, all the parameters in the model are optimized as Equation
(5) through Adam optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.001. The 160K outputs in the reference
corpus are used as the targeted outputs for RL training. The batch size, dropout rate, and gradient
clipping value are set the same as those in the pre-training process. When calculating the rewards (i.e.
the embedding similarities), we only consider the tokens out of a fixed stopword list which consists of
common punctuations and special symbols. Pre-trained Google news word embeddings1 are adopted
to compute the similarities. And in order to accelerate the convergence of the model, we set all the
rewards less than 0.5 to be 0, and the others remain the original values.
Decoding. In the test phase, the greedy method and beam search can be used for decoding. And
we empirically find that if we first get N candidates with top-N scores in beam search and then
feed them into the dialogue model, treat the one with the highest reward as the crafted input, the
performance improves significantly. In the experiments, we report the results of greedy decoding of
the pre-trained model (Pre-trained Greedy), greedy decoding of the RL-trained model (RL Greedy),
and beam search of the RL-trained model with N candidates (RL BeamSearch(N )).
5.2 Experimental Results
We conduct experiments on two types of target output lists. To construct the Generated target output
list, we first feed 10k human utterances (have no overlap with the reference corpus) from Twitter into
the dialogue model to get 10k generated responses and then randomly sample 200 responses as the
targets in length 1-3, 4-6 and 7-10, respectively. The Real target output list is obtained by randomly
collecting sentences directly from Twitter. The number of target outputs in each length group is also
200.
1https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/
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Figure 2: Success rates of the pre-trained model and the RL-trained model with different decoding
methods. The upper row and the lower row show the results on the Generated target list and the Real
target list with various lengths respectively.
Given a targeted output, when the proposed model finds an input which leads to an output whose
similarity to the targeted one is above a preset threshold, we say the manipulation is successful.
Figure 2 shows the success rates of our proposed model for manipulating the Twitter dialogue model
in two experimental settings. The figures show how success rates vary with different thresholds. First
of all, from the figures, we can see that for both the Generated and the Real target lists, RL-based
model with beam search can achieve a success rate around 80%− 100% with a score 0.5. Especially
for more than around 80% Generated targets with length greater than or equal to 4, we can find
desired inputs that lead to a similarity score above 0.7. Second, we can see that in most of the
scenarios, RL Greedy obviously outperforms Pre-trained Greedy, which demonstrates that using
reward signals to fine-tune the policy network through RL significantly strengthens its capability for
crafting desired inputs. Besides, compared with greedy decoding method, beam search with multiple
candidates improves the success rates a lot. And compared with N = 50, the beam search methods
with N = 200 candidates improve the performance slightly, which means that interacting with the
dialogue model for a reasonably small number of times can guarantee a considerable success rate.
Another key observation is that the model performs significantly better on the Generated target list
than on the Real target output list. Actually, the neural dialogue models suffer from the safe response
problem [43]. Such models tend to offer generic responses to diverse inputs, which makes it hard for
the model to provide a specific targeted response (often seen in real human conversations).
In order to further demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, for each Real targeted
output, we feed its corresponding real inputs in the corpus into the dialogue model to check how
similar the output responses and the target ones are. We calculate these similarity scores for each
Real targeted output for the real inputs and the inputs found by the proposed model and report the
average value in Table 1. According to the table, we observe that even inputting the real inputs, the
similarity scores between the outputs and the target outputs are not high. Besides, with the crafted
inputs from the proposed framework, these similarity scores are significantly improved. For example,
for RL BeamSearch(200), the similarity is improved by 41.5%, 34.0% and 28.3% for the target
outputs with length 1-3, 4-6 and 7-10, respectively.
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Table 1: Average embedding similarity scores between the output and the target output in terms of
Real target output list.
Length 1-3 4-6 7-10
Real Input 0.439 0.518 0.566
Pre-trained Greedy 0.446 0.529 0.559
RL Greedy 0.486 0.560 0.588
RL BeamSearch(50) 0.599 0.678 0.709
RL BeamSearch(200) 0.621 0.694 0.726
Table 2: Case Study. The first column shows the inputs found by RL BeamSearch(200) according to
given target outputs. The middle column shows the target outputs and the outputs generated by the
dialogue model to the inputs. The column on the right side shows the embedding similarity score
between outputs and target outputs.
Inputs Responses Similarity
soo calm . you should be
nervous .
Target: i ’ m just trying to be a good person
Output: i ’ m not . i ’ m just trying to be a 0.952
better person .
guess she’ll be invited . Target: i ’ m sure she ’ ll be fine . 0.946Output: i ’ m sure she ’ ll be a good one .
neither ready pls Target: i ’ m not ready for this 1.0Output: i ’ m not ready for this
how is nephew ? Target: he ’ s a good guy 0.982Output: he ’ s good . he ’ s a good guy .
you weren’t invited . Target: i was there 1.0Output: i was there .
Table 2 shows five examples in the manipulating experiments. The first three target outputs are from
the Generated target output list, while the other two are from the Real target list. Given those target
outputs, desired inputs are successfully crafted. Each of them leads to an output of the dialogue model
similar or equal to the target one, evaluating by the embedding similarity measurement. Besides,
unlike some related works [21, 37] where crafted text inputs are ungrammatical and meaningless, the
inputs generated by our model are smooth and natural utterances. This is because the decoder of the
Seq2Seq model in the Reverse Dialogue Generator serves as a language model, which guarantees the
smoothness of the generated inputs.
6 Conclusion
Recently, dialogue systems are being integrated into our daily lives at a quite rapid pace. In the
practical implementation of dialogue systems, neural dialogue models play an important role. How-
ever, recent concerns have risen for neural models across all domains as to whether they can be
manipulated (in most cases, by crafted adversarial examples), which inspires us to examine the same
problem of neural dialogue models. Our work reveals a dark side of such models that they are likely
to be manipulated to "say what I want" – by finding well-designed inputs, we can induce the dialogue
agent to provide desired outputs. We propose a reinforcement learning based Reverse Dialogue
Generator which learns to craft such inputs automatically in the process of interacting with the
black-box neural dialogue model. Extensive experiments on a representative neural dialogue model
demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed model and show that dialogue systems used in our
daily lives can indeed be manipulated, which is a warning about the security of dialogue systems for
both the research community and the industry.
For future works, we plan to extend the current framework to other sequence models. Besides, in
this work, we examine the security problem of dialogue systems. In future works, we will also
investigate concerns about the privacy of them, specifically, the possibility of dialogue systems to
leak the sensitive information of users.
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